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Jonathan L. Kvanvig

Scheduled Talks for 2009-10

1. "Curiosity," Epistemic Emotions Conference, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland, July 14, 2009.
2. "Norms of Assertion," Department of Philosophy, University of Texas, September 11, 2009.
3. "The New Atheism," John Brown University, September 23, 2009.
4. "Norms of Assertion," Department of Philosophy, University of Arkansas, September 24, 2009.
5. "TBA", University of California-Riverside, January 27, 2010.
6. "Skepticism about Norms of Assertion," Epistemology Conference, Northwestern University, February 17, 2010.
7. "SSI and Norms of Assertion," APA, comments on Mylan Engel's symposium paper, Chicago, IL, February 18-20, 2010.
8. "Philosophical Theology and Value-Driven Epistemology," Abilene Christian University, March 4, 2010.
9. "The Epistemology of Understanding," Abilene Christian University, March 4, 2010.
10. "TBA", Russell Conference, San Francisco, CA, March 11-14, 2010.
11. "Curiosity and the Response-Dependent Value of Understanding," Pacific Division, APA, session on The Epistemology of Understanding, San Francisco, CA, March 31-April 4, 2010.
12. "Intellectualism," 2nd Annual USA Philosophy Workshop, May 11-12, 2010, Orange Beach, Alabama.

Scheduled Talks for 2010-11

1. "Curiosity and Norms of Assertion: A Common Playbook", Knowledge, Virtue, and Action - An Aretaic Turn in Epistemology?, to be held September 30th – October 2nd 2010 in Jena, Germany.

   I expect to talk about the connection between the concept of curiosity and the question of the norms of assertion.  It turns out that Williamson's arguments for the knowledge account of assertion can also be deployed to defend the view that curiosity is a desire to know (see Whitcomb's forthcoming PPR piece about curiosity), and I'm opposed to both approaches.  So I'll talk about the connections between the two issues, the underlying rationale for a Williamsonian approach, and what I think is a more correct and helpful approach in both domains.  This better approach will tie into my general approach that motivates epistemological inquiry in a value-driven way, fitting in with the general perspective that it is a certain kind of justification and a certain kind of understanding that are of fundamental importance in epistemology (and not the knowledge-driven account favored by Williamson and his followers).

Works in Progress

1. A Perspectivalist Theory of Justification: Towards a New Coherentism
2. Destiny and Decision: Essays in the Philosophy of Religion
• "Autonomy, Finality, and the Choice Model of Hell"
• "Losing Your Soul"
• "Universalism and the Problem of Hell"
• "Dead-End Molinism"
• "Modeling Divine Deliberation"
• "Open Theism and the Future"
• "Creation, Deliberation, and Molinism"
• "A Tale of Two Cronies"
3. "Coherentism and Justified Inconsistent Beliefs: A Solution"
4. "Infinitism, Holism, and the Regress Argument"

A central problem for value-driven epistemology involves the attempt to explain what a theory of justification must look like in order to help address the problem of explaining how knowledge is more valuable than true belief. One central problem here is the swamping problem, the problem of explaining how justified true belief is superior to true belief itself—a problem faced, especially, by process reliabilism. Careful attention to what it takes to provide an adequate solution to the swamping problem provides a new motivation for infinitism, though not for a reliabilist version of it.
5. "Sensitivity and the Value Problem"

In the recent rise of interest in value-driven epistemology, one theme that has emerged involves the claim that internalists have an easier time with the value problem than do externalists. In particular, it is regularly argued that the swamping problem is one that internalists can meet but reliabilists, at least process reliabilists, cannot. There is little discussion, however, of other externalist views, such as those relying on sensitivity or safety conditions, and the arguments on behalf of the claim that internalists can solve the swamping problem need work. My paper will attempt to clarify this issue, arguing that only a special kind of internalist can solve the swamping problem and that defenses of modal epistemology, including those appealing to safety or sensitivity conditions, fare no better than process reliabilists when encountering value problems in epistemology.
6. "Curiosity, Understanding, and Norms of Assertion"
7. "Curiosity and the Response-Dependent Value of Understanding"

I organize the annual Philosophy of Religion Conference. The website can be found here. The conference moved to Baylor University in 2006-7, and the next conference is February 4-7, 2010 in San Antonio.

I edit a recurring volume of original articles in the philosophy of religion with Oxford University Press titled Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, with the inaugural volume published in spring of 2008.

My interests lie in these areas:

Metaphysics & Epistemology

Philosophy of Religion

Philosophy of Language

Philosophy of Logic

Logic

Ethics

Philosophy of Science