Searle’s argument

  1. (Premise) If a computer program could understand Chinese, then the person in the Chinese room who memorized all the rules and symbols understands Chinese.
  2. (Premise) The person in the Chinese room does not understand Chinese.
  3. Therefore, a computer program cannot understand Chinese.

 

Searlean argument against functionalism

1.      (Premise) If functionalism is correct, then a computer program could understand Chinese.

2.      (Premise) A computer program cannot understand Chinese.

3.      Therefore, functionalism is not correct.

 

A problem for Searle

1.      (Premise) We could empirically know that an alien understands Chinese, even if alien brains were biochemically completely unlike ours.

2.      (Premise) The only way we could empirically know that an alien with a brain biochemically completely unlike ours understands Chinese would be by noting similarity of behavior and similarity of functional interconnection to a human who understands Chinese.

3.      (Premise) The only way similarity of behavior and similarity of functional interconnection could yield empirical knowledge of the hypothesis that someone understands Chinese is if similarity of behavior and similarity of functional interconnection were what understanding Chinese consisted in.

4.      Therefore, similarity of behavior and similarity of functional interconnection is what understanding Chinese consists in.

 

A solution for the anti-functionalist?

 

Proper function argument

  1. (Premise) One can have a mental state even though its defining connections to other states are actually not present.
  2. The way a state is defined by its connections to other states does not require that these connections be actually present. (By 1)
  3. (Premise) The only way one can define a mental state by means of connections that are not actually present is by defining it by means of connections that should be present.
  4. (Premise) If modern naturalism is true, then it makes no sense to talk of what connections should be present.
  5. Therefore, at least one of functionalism and modern naturalism is false.

 

This might also push one to eliminativism.

 

Animal pain argument against functionalism

1.      (Premise) Pain states in mice are not functionally isomorphic to pain states in humans.

2.      (Premise) Mice feel pain.

3.      (Premise) If functionalism is true, then pain states are all functionally isomorphic.

4.      Therefore, functionalism is not true.

 

Multiple realizability argument against functionalism

1.      (Premise) Aliens could have beliefs just as we do without having states that are functionally isomorphic to ours.

2.      (Premise) If functionalism is true, then sameness of belief requires functional isomorphism.

3.      Therefore, functionalism is false.

 

Eliminative materialism

 

Considerations in favor:

 

Considerations against: