Strawson’s argument (modified)
1.
(Premise) We are
only responsible for a choice if it is causally preceded by a principle of
choice we are responsible for.
2.
(Premise) We are
only responsible for something if it is causally preceded by a choice we are responsible
for.
3.
Therefore, every
choice we are responsible for is causally preceded by a choice we are
responsible for. (By (1) and (2))
4.
(Premise) If
every A is causally preceded by an A, then either there is an infinite
causal regress of As or a causal circle
of As.
5.
Therefore, if we
are responsible for a choice, then there is an infinite causal regress or
circle of choices we are responsible for. (By (3) and (4))
6.
(Premise) There
are no causal circles or infinite regresses among our choices.
7.
Therefore, we are
not responsible for any choice. (By (5) and (6))
An argument for libertarianism
1.
(Premise) If you
are in any way responsible for E,
then either there is another choice or state of mind that you are in some way
responsible for among E’s causes, or
you freely caused E without any prior
causes determining you to choose E.
2.
Therefore, if you
are in any way responsible for anything, then either you caused something
without any prior causes determining you to choose it, or there is an infinite
causal regress or circle of our choices and/or states of mind. (By (1))
3.
(Premise) There
are no causal loops.
4.
(Premise) You’ve
only made finitely many choices and have had finitely many states of mind.
5.
Therefore, if you
are in any way responsible for anything, then you freely caused something
without any prior causes determining you to choose it.
An argument Chisholm thinks would be sound if Aquinas
were right
1.
(Premise from
Aquinas) God is the cause of every movement.
2.
(Premise) Every
action is a movement (of the soul, say).
3.
(Premise) If y is the cause of x’s action, and x is neither identical with y nor responsible for y, then x is not responsible for the action.
4.
(Premise) Nobody
but God is responsible for or identical with God.
5.
Therefore, if x acts, God is the cause of his action.
(By (1) and (2))
6.
Therefore, if x is not God and x acts, x is not
responsible for his action. (By (3), (4) and (5))
An argument pointing to agent causation and inspired
by Chisholm
1.
(Premise) If an
action is caused deterministically by some event that the agent is not
responsible for, then the agent is not responsible for the action.
2.
(Premise) If an
action is caused non-deterministically by some event that the agent is not
responsible for, then the agent is not responsible for the action.
3.
(Premise) If an
action is uncaused, then the agent is not responsible for the action.
4.
(Premise) If an
agent is responsible for something, it either is an action (counting choices as
actions) or a result of an earlier action that the agent is responsible for.
5.
(Premise) There
is a first thing I am responsible for, call it A.
6.
A is an
action. (By (4) and (5))
7.
A is not
caused by any event that the agent is responsible for. (By (5))
8.
A is not
caused by any event that the agent is not responsible for. (By (1), (2) and
(5))
9.
A is not
uncaused. (By (3) and (5))
10.
Therefore, A is caused by something that is not an
event. (By (7)-(9))
11. (Premise) The best candidate for that something is
the agent himself or herself, working by “immanent” agent causation.
12. Therefore, probably, A was caused by the agent working by “immanent” agent causation.