Proper Function
- (Premise)
Experiences have the fulfillment of a role as a proper function.
- (Premise)
States that are fully described by neurological science lack proper
functions, unless evolutionary theory can explain proper functions.
- (Premise)
Evolutionary theory cannot explain proper function.
- Therefore,
experiences are not fully described by neurological science.
Evolutionary Accounts of Proper Function
- A
function of x is Z iff x
exists because it tends to do Z (Larry Wright).
- Problem:
gas leak that knocks out technicians
- Can
try to qualify: good, or contributing to harmony/homeostasis
- A
function of x with respect to P is Z iff x is a member of a reproductive family, a
copy of an earlier item with respect to P, the earlier item
performed Z with respect to P, x exists in part
because of that earlier performance. (Millikan)
Qualia
A Version of Jackson’s Basic Argument
- (Premise)
Someone who knows all there is to know about physical reality does not automatically
know all there is to know about others’ visual experiences of red.
- (Premise)
If someone who knows all there is to know about an aspect A of reality does not automatically
know all there is to know, then reality goes beyond A.
- Therefore,
reality goes beyond the physical.
Objection: Equivocation
on “knows” in (1) and (2). Know-that vs.
know-how.
Response to Know-How Objection
- (Premise)
Coming to believe that other people have minds does not gain one any
know-how.
- (Premise)
Coming to believe that other people have minds gains one knowledge what
other people are experiencing when they experience red.
- Therefore,
knowledge what other people are experiencing when they experience red is
not know-how.
Parody Story
Mary grew up on earth, studying astronomy, indeed learning
all the astrophysical knowledge there is about the moon. Then she went to the moon, visited the crater
Clavius, and exclaimed: “Ah, Clavius
is here.” Before she visited Clavius,
she did not know the proposition expressed by “Clavius
is here.” She only knew the proposition expressed by “Clavius is there.” So the truth about the moon is not exhausted by
astrophysics.
Objection to Causal Inefficacy
- (Premise)
If qualia never cause anything, then they do not
cause any mental states.
- (Premise)
If we know that qualia exist, then some quale must have caused a mental state.
- Therefore,
qualia sometimes cause something.