Leibniz on Modality

• p is possible if and only if not-p is not necessary
• p is necessary if and only if not-p is not possible
• p is contingent if and only if neither p nor not-p is necessary

· Thus, p is morally possible if and only if not-p is not morally necessary. Etc.

· Anything morally possible is metaphysically possible, but not the other way around.

· Anything metaphysically necessary, is morally necessary, but not the other way around.

· As it turns out, everything that is true is morally necessary. Thus, moral necessity, moral possibility, and actuality all coincide.

Leibniz (Grua, pp. 493-494, quoted in Rescher, “Contingentia Mundi”), transl. ARP	Logical restatement:
It is true that this proposition: “God wills that work [w] which is most worthy of him” is [metaphysically] necessary.	Necessarily (if w is most worthy of God, then God wills w).
But it is not true that he wills it [w] necessarily.	Not necessarily (God wills w).
For the proposition “this work [w] is the most worthy” is not a [metaphysically] necessary truth;	Not necessarily (w is most worthy).
it is an indemonstrable, contingent, factual truth.	Contingently true: (w is most worthy).
I believe that one can say generally that this proposition is [metaphysically] necessary;  his will acts according to the biggest inclination.	Necessarily (if A is according to the biggest inclination, God does A).
But it does not follow that it acts necessarily.	Not necessarily (God does A)
This like its being necessary that future contingents should be determined,	Necessarily (if F will happen, then F will happen). Or maybe: Necessarily (if F0 happens now, then F will happen).
but its not being the case that they are necessarily determined, i.e., that they should not be in any way contingent.	Not necessarily (F will happen). I.e.: Not (F is in no way contingent).